explaining why so many different principles and objects can become sacred, along with an account of how sacredness permits and motivates different patterns of evil behavior.
We begin by defining our key terms -sacredness and morality. We then introduce Moral Foundations Theory as a way of broadening and mapping the moral domain, and thereby identifying diverse kinds of sacred objects. In the third section we show how this moral foundations approach can also broaden our view of evil, and we offer a definition of evil based on group-level perceptions of threats to sacralized objects. In the fourth section we take a qualitative approach to sacredness, showing how two diametrically opposed moralities can both lead to idealistic violence. In the fifth section we introduce the Moral Foundations Sacredness scale, a simple instrument that can be used to measure the degree to which people sacralize each of the five foundations of morality. We conclude by considering unanswered questions about which foundational values are most likely to lead to idealistic violence.
Sacredness and Morality
Evidence for totemism, animal worship, and other proto-religious practices goes back tens of thousands of years; even Homo Neanderthalis may have treated some objects as sacred (Solecki, 1975) . Human beings have been engaged in religious practices for so long, with such intensity, and so ubiquitously that many researchers now believe that religion is an evolutionary adaptation (e.g., Wilson, 2002) , even if belief in gods may have originally emerged as a byproduct of other cognitive capacities (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2003; Kirkpatrick, 1999) . But as we have argued elsewhere , the social psychology of religion should not focus on belief in gods; it should focus on the group-binding and societyconstituting effects of ritual practice and other religious behaviors. Whether one believes that God is a delusion, a reality, or an adaptation, it is hard to deny that human behavior now includes a rather strong tendency to invest objects, people, places, days, colors, words, and shapes with extraordinary importance that is in no way justified by practical or utilitarian considerations (Eliade, 1959) . The psychology of sacredness may (or may not) have co-evolved with belief in gods, but it is now a very general aspect of human nature. We believe that sacredness is crucial for understanding morality, including fully secular moralities.
The academic study of sacredness is roughly a century old, and most of the major treatments of it have emphasized the radical discontinuity between sacredness and the concerns of ordinary life. Nisbet (1966 Nisbet ( /1993 ) summarizes the sociological use of the word: "The sacred includes the mores, the non-rational, the religious and ritualistic ways of behavior that are valued beyond whatever utility they possess." The first major treatment of sacredness came from Emile Durkheim (1915 Durkheim ( /1965 , who argued that the distinction between sacred and profane (i.e., ordinary, practical) is among the most fundamental and generative aspects of human cognition. It is generative because sacredness is always a collective representation serving collective functions. Shared emotions and practices related to sacred things bind people together into cults, churches, and communities. Sacredness does not require a God. Flags, national holidays, and other markers of collective solidarity are sacred in the same way-and serve the same groupbinding function-as crosses and holy days.
A few years later, Rudolph Otto (1917 Otto ( /1958 wrote about das Heilige (from the Greek heilos, translated as "sacred" or "holy") as something that could in different instances be mysterious, awe-inspiring, or terrifying, but that above all was "wholly other," a category completely separate from ordinary life. Following Otto, Eliade (1959) explored the psychological and phenomenological aspects of sacredness, but he also followed Durkheim in emphasizing its social functions. People want to live in a sacralized cosmos, he said, and they work together to create dense webs of shared meanings which valorize their land, their traditions, and their place at the center of the cosmos. Eliade noted that Western modernity was an historical aberration in having created the first fully desacralized, profane world. But he also noted that sacredness cannot be entirely removed from people's lives. When deprived of shared sacred objects, people still invest certain dates, objects, and places with a kind of sacred importance, for example, things related to the first time one fell in love, or traveled abroad:
Even for the most frankly nonreligious man, all these places still retain an exceptional, a unique quality; they are the 'holy places' of his private universe, as if it were in such spots that he had received the revelation of a reality other than that in which he participates through his ordinary daily life (Eliade, 1959, p. 24) .
Psychologists have operationalized sacredness in ways that are consistent with these earlier approaches. Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner (2000, p. 853 ) concentrated on the absolute separation from the profane, defining sacred values as "any value that a moral community explicitly or implicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values."
They found that when participants were asked to resolve dilemmas in which sacred values (i.e., human life) could be traded off for a profane value (i.e., money), they often felt tainted and immoral, and they sometimes refused to make tradeoffs at all. Ritov and Baron (1999) examined "protected" values -defined as "those that people think should not be traded off" (p. 79) -and found that when such values are activated people are more likely to show the omission bias, and become less utilitarian (see also Baron & Spranca, 1997 Considering these two definitions together, the relevance of sacredness for moral psychology should be apparent. The human ability to live peacefully and cooperatively in large groups of non-kin is one of the greatest puzzles in the social sciences, particularly for those who take an evolutionary perspective (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Darwin, 1871 Darwin, /1998 Henrich & Henrich, 2007) . The existence and resilience of human moral systems requires an explanation. If the "evolved psychological mechanisms" that are part of moral systems include a psychology of sacredness, then the puzzle is much easier to solve 2 than if human beings are modeled as fully profane-i.e., as rational agents in pursuit of self-interest, broadly construed. In the next section we present our theory of morality (Haidt & Graham, 2007) as augmented by greater attention to questions of sacredness.
Morality is Constructed, on Five Foundations
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was first proposed by two cultural psychologists who noticed convergences between anthropological descriptions of morality and evolutionary theories of human sociality. For example, anthropological accounts of reciprocal gift-giving as a means of forging relationships (Malinowski, 1922) bore obvious similarities to evolutionary discussions of "reciprocal altruism" (Trivers, 1971 Perhaps because the equalizer metaphor is intuitively appealing, and perhaps because we have frequently presented simple graphs showing how groups differ on the five scores provided by the MFQ, many readers of our work have interpreted Moral Foundations Theory as a kind of multiple regression theory of morality. Like the "Big 5" theory of personality, all you need to know about a person is her static and stable scores on five traits or dimensions. However, from our earliest writings we have emphasized that foundations are just foundations. A morality must be constructed on top of those foundations, and the construction process is always done socially, as part of one's development within specific ecological settings and subcultures.
We have found Dan McAdams' work on narrative to be particularly helpful for understanding this construction process. McAdams (2001) has studied "life stories," which he describes as "psychosocial constructions, coauthored by the person himself or herself and the cultural context within which the person's life is embedded and given meaning" (p. 101). Life stories help individuals make sense of their past experiences, and guide them as they make perfectly answered by theories of multi-level selection in which genes are passed on as individuals compete with individuals and as groups compete with groups (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Wilson, 2002 found it most useful to move from "life stories" to "ideological narratives" (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2010) .
In The Political Brain, Drew Westen (2007) Each person must be the first author of her own life story. More than a little bit of plagiarism would be shameful. But when people join together to pursue political projects-from the demand for civil rights to violent revolution to genocide-they must share a common story, one that they accept as true without having authored. Ideological narratives, then, by their very nature, are always stories about good and evil. They identify heroes and villains, they explain how the villains got the upper hand, and they lay out or justify the means by which-if we can just come together and fight hard enough-we can vanquish the villains and return the world to its balanced or proper state.
Ideological narratives provide a crucial link between a psychological analysis of moral foundations and the sorts of violent extremists described by Berlin. First, we simply observe that people love stories. All around the world, cultures rely upon stories to socialize their children, and narrative thinking has been called one of two basic forms of human cognition (along with logical reasoning; see Bruner, 1986) . Second, we note that successful stories-the ones that get transmitted from person to person and decade to decade-are those that fit well with the human mind, particularly by eliciting strong emotions, as found in analyses of successful urban legends (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001 ). We think moral foundations theory provides the most comprehensive account of the "hooks" in the moral mind to which a good ideological narrative can attach. Third, we note that intergroup competition, and particularly warfare, causes prevailing ideological narratives to become more extreme, often to the point of being cartoonish (e.g., the frequent charge that one's enemies enjoy killing or even eating children). Such extreme narratives seem to serve the purpose of mobilizing and inspiring one's team, and preparing the way for its members to "break eggs," as Berlin lamented. As Baumeister (1997, p. 190 ) pointed out, "One far-reaching difference between idealistic evil and other forms of evil is that idealistic evil is nearly always fostered by groups, as opposed to individuals...To put this more bluntly: It is apparently necessary to have someone else tell you that violent means are justified by high ends."
The Five Foundations of Evil Scientific treatments of evil have tended to define it in terms of a single moral foundation: Harm/care. For instance, evil has been operationalized as "human actions that harm others" (Staub, 2003, p. 5) , "intentional interpersonal harm" (Baumeister, 1997, p. 8) , and "intentionally behaving -or causing others to act -in ways that demean, dehumanize, harm, destroy, or kill innocent people" (Zimbardo, 2004, p. 23) . We share the normative intuition of these authors that the prototypes of evil are acts of cruelty and violence, and would even agree that these are the most important kinds of evil to understand and prevent. However, as a descriptive account of the psychological underpinnings of positive and negative moral judgments, Moral Foundations Theory suggests that perceptions of evil may be based on concerns other than harm, cruelty, and violence.
If ideological narratives can draw on any combination of the five foundations, then there can be many kinds of heroes and many kinds of villains. Table 1 shows how each foundation may be used to support the sacralization and demonization of diverse objects. The first column
gives sacred values related to each foundation. As described above, these are the values that are set apart from everyday profane concerns and protected from tradeoffs; they are moral concerns imbued with value far beyond practical utilities or self-interest. The second column gives the sacred objects-the people, things, and ideas that can become sacralized because they are linked to these sacred values. And just as something is seen as worthy of ultimate protection, there is a vision of what it must be protected from: this is a vision of evil. Note that these visions of evil aren't simply people or things that go against the foundational concerns, like vices. Evil is something more, something that threatens to hurt, oppress, betray, subvert, contaminate, or otherwise profane something that is held as sacred. Also important to note is that the sacred object prompting the vision of evil is not held by just one person (say, a favorite teddy bear), but a group, who explicitly or implicitly cohere in these twin visions of sacredness and evil. More than just a very morally bad thing, evil is something special that comes out of a shared narrative, and in fact could be said to play the starring role in that narrative. Evil is whatever stands in the way of sacredness. (Pierce, 1978) offers an in-depth look into the moral worldview of ultra-right-wing white supremacy and anti-Semitism, from inside that worldview, as its adherents want it to be seen. A narrator from an idealized, post-America Aryan future presents the diaries of Earl Turner, who led a resistance army against the diabolical "System."
The System was dominated by Jewish human-rights advocates who outlawed guns and employed black men to confiscate those guns from whites. Whites were left defenseless as nonwhites raped and pillaged at will. Turner wistfully remembers his "once upon a time" when whites didn't have to live in fear, when their racial pride wasn't censored as hate speech and their secondamendment rights were upheld. As many have pointed out, The Turner Diaries is a compendium of right-wing fears and angers, augmented into a dystopian vision, and then finally a utopian dénouement as Turner deals the decisive blow to the System by flying a plane with a nuclear warhead into the Pentagon building.
Although one can find evidence of values related to Fairness (reciprocity, vengeance) and Authority (honor, social order), the book treats as sacred a tight constellation of values related to Ingroup and Purity above all: loyalty and self-sacrifice for Turner's underground rebellion are painted as moral ideals, as are the self-control, cleanliness, and purity of the white race (presented in stark contrast to the vile, animalistic, and self-indulgent behavior of other races).
The white race (and its "pure" bloodline) is the sacralized object to be protected, and the reader is encouraged to root and hope for its survival into future generations. With this vision of sacredness, of course, comes a vision of evil, and Pierce offers an amplified and even fetishized vision of the all-consuming power and viciousness of the Jews and Blacks who threaten the survival of the white race. By giving these exemplars of evil such power in his fictional world, Pierce brings the impulse to protect the sacralized object from evil to a fever pitch, and the reader is asked to cheer for the violence that is necessary (eggs must be broken) to achieve this morally sacred end.
At one point, Turner and his comrades load up a delivery truck with explosives, and detonate it under a federal building:
At 9:15 yesterday morning our bomb went off in the F.B.I.'s national headquarters building....the damage is immense.
[W]e gaped with a mixture of horror and elation at the devastation....It is a heavy burden of responsibility for us to bear, since most of the victims of our bomb were only pawns who were no more committed to the sick philosophy of the racially destructive goals of the System than we are. But there is no way we can destroy the System without hurting many thousands of innocent people-no way. It is a cancer too deeply rooted in our flesh. And if we don't destroy the System before it destroys us-if we don't cut this cancer out of our living flesh-our whole race will die. (Pierce, 1978, p. 42 
Sacred Victims: The Weather Underground
The Ingroup, Authority, and Purity foundations reinforce each other in many cases of tribal, ethnic, or nationalist fervor, and such causes tend to be supported by more conservative elements within a society. But the propensity for idealistic violence is not limited to the political right; any combination of foundations can be used to support an ideological narrative that motivates violence.
Splitting from the Students for a Democratic Society in the late 1960s, the Weather Underground was a militant left-wing group active throughout the 1970s. Like most student groups at the time, this group was passionately concerned about atrocities happening in Vietnam, and about the injustice of the war itself. But their primary area of sacralization was black victims in white America. Soaking up and producing reams of revolutionary and Communist literatures, the group -many of whom lived together in tightly-knit quarters -quickly established an ideological narrative that split the moral world into black and white, and white was bad.
Nonwhites, poor, and other oppressed peoples around the world were innocent victims deserving of justice, and White dominance (seen both in resistance to civil rights progress in the U.S. and imperialist actions in other countries) was the ultimate evil, harming and humiliating the sacred victims. Activist rhetoric quickly morphed from SNCC-style nonviolence to calls for open and armed revolt. After a series of bombings, the group went into hiding from the FBI in 1970, and started delivering communiqués to the press: "It is our job to blast away the myths of the total superiority of the man. We did not choose to live in a time of war. We choose only to become guerillas and to urge our people to prepare for war rather than become accomplices in the genocide of our sisters and brothers. We learned from Amerikan history about policies of exterminating an entire people and their magnificent cultures -the Indians, the blacks, the Vietnamese...Don't be tricked by talk. Arm yourselves and shoot to live! We are building a culture and a society that can resist genocide" (Dohrn, Ayers, & Jones, 2006, p. 157) .
The members of the Weather Underground were horrified by the suffering and oppression of victims in their own time, and they wove that suffering into a larger narrative stretching back to the founding of America via genocide of Native Americans and enslavement of Africans. Once victims had been sacralized and the past reconstructed, the devil was clear: white capitalist America, which must be destroyed, by any means available. Even though their morality was based squarely on the Harm/care foundation, which generally makes people recoil from violence, the group found a way to justify and motivate violence. They perpetrated dozens of bombings, mostly of police stations and other buildings that could plausibly be said to be part of the "system." At one point they had planned to detonate a bomb at a Non-Commissioned Officers' dance at the Fort Dix U.S. Army base, but the bomb went off in the bomb-maker's Greenwich Village townhouse. After that episode, the group tried to avoid killing people, and focused on destroying property; nevertheless, several members were involved in a botched 1981 robbery of a Brink's truck that resulted in the killing of two police officers and two security guards (Berger, 2006) . The group's leader, Mark Rudd, said of the time, "I cherished my hate as a badge of moral superiority" (Green & Siegel, 2003) .
Although their Harm and Fairness values led them to idealistic violence, those values also contributed to much self-criticism in later years. Some came to denounce the violent tactics, some still support them, but most came to agree with Berlin's warning about the dangers of moral absolutism. "The Vietnam war made us crazy," said Brian Flanagan, years after his involvement with the group. "When you think you have right on your side, you can do some horrific things" (Green & Siegel, 2003) . Similarly, Bill Ayers reflected that "One of the great mistakes of 1969 is that we thought we [alone] had it right. The main failures we had were those of smugness and certainty and arrogance" (Berger, 2006, p. 114) . Finally, Naomi Jaffe reflected on some of the group's vacillations between extreme positions (whichever seemed more in line with the revolutionary narrative at the time): "It was reflected in the see-sawing from dismissing the white working class to glorifying the white working class. Obviously, both those positions are wrong. But they're wrong because what's right is pretty difficult and complicated" (Berger, 2006, p. 282) . This vacillation illustrates two features of sacredness: it is all-or-nothing (the object in question is either sacred or profane), and it is constructed by tightly-knit moral communities, not by individuals.
Quantitative Approach: The Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale
If moral sacredness is so important and powerful, can it be brought into the lab? We have found the most useful empirical operationalization of sacredness to be Phil Tetlock's work on taboo tradeoffs of sacred values (Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000) , which demonstrated that people often refused to exchange sacred values for profane concerns, and felt contaminated when they did. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) followed Tetlock's method by presenting people with violations of the five moral foundations -for example, "Kick a dog in the head, hard" for Harmand asking how much money they would require to do it (with an option to refuse the taboo tradeoff for any amount of money). A major advantage of this approach is that compared to other self-report measures of moral personality (e.g., the Defining Issues Test; Rest, 1979) , the very experience of taking the survey triggers some gut-level intuitive reactions (Haidt, 2001) , as well as some deliberative reasoning. We have since developed and revised these items into The Moral
Foundations Sacredness Scale, which we present here (see Appendix) in hopes that other researchers in moral psychology may use it to investigate the full range of moral concerns that people can hold sacred.
As the Appendix shows, the scale gives four items for each foundation, as well as an optional four-item subscale with personally unpleasant outcomes that are not relevant to moral concerns (e.g., having a severe headache for two weeks). This nonmoral subscale can be used as a statistical control, to remove individual differences in attitudes about money and about tradeoffs in general when sacredness is not involved. All items are presented to participants in randomized order, without foundation or item labels.
Many of the items were inspired by previous treatments of sacredness; for example, the item about flag-burning reflects the attention Durkheim (1915 Durkheim ( /1965 paid to the national flag as a sacred object, and the item about selling one's soul mirrors Haidt, Bjorklund and Murphy's (2000) observation that participants (even those who didn't believe they had a soul) resisted this offer as a tainting tradeoff. In developing and selecting items for the scale, we tried to capture a wide range of content domains for each foundational concern; for instance, instead of maximizing alpha, which would have led us to retain only nation-related items for the Ingroup scale, we selected a final set of items that concerned loyalty to nation, family, and club or team. For this reason, internal consistencies are relatively low (average α = .64 for the fouritem subscales), but sufficient given the lack of redundant items, wide range of topics, and small number of items (for a related discussion, see Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2010) .
The items are responded to on an 8-point scale, from "$0 (I'd do it for free)," then $10, and then increasing by factors of 10 to a million dollars, with a top option of "never for any amount of money." The scale is scored in two ways: one simply averages subscale items on the full 8-point scale, and the other calculates for each person how many items (out of 4) they responded "never for any amount of money" for each subscale. (This latter method sacrifices a good deal of information, but is closer to the definition of sacredness as a refusal to make tradeoffs.)
The top panel of Table 2 provides full scale means and standard deviations for a large heterogeneous (and international) sample of over 27,000 visitors to YourMorals.org, as well as separate means for gender and political identification groups. The bottom panel presents the same data scored by the stricter criterion of number of "never" answers for each subsample. As both panels show, women are more likely than men to sacralize values related to all five foundations, both in terms of requiring more money to violate them, and being more likely to refuse to violate them for any amount of money (ts > 17, ps < .0001). We found something similar with an early version of this scale (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009 , Study 3), and speculated that there might be a general tendency for conservatives to be more likely to refuse monetary tradeoffs in general (perhaps seeing such tradeoffs as a form of prostitution). The addition of the nonmoral subscale supports this speculation, in that it correlates weakly but reliably with political conservatism (r = .08, p < .001). When we computed difference scores by subtracting participants' nonmoral scores from their foundation scores (to partial out individual differences in amounts required and propensity to refuse doing things for money in general), political conservatism remains positively correlated with Ingroup (r = .11, p < .0001), Authority (r = .17, p < .0001), and Purity (r = .27, p < .0001), and is weakly negatively correlated with Harm (r = -.12, p < .0001) and Fairness (r = -.05, p = .02). Finally, the last column of the War subscale scale included items expressing justification for war, such as "Under some conditions, war is necessary to maintain justice." In multiple regressions including political identification and gender as covariates, pro-war attitudes were negatively predicted by Harm (β = -.13, p < .001) and Fairness (β = -.11, p < .01), but positively predicted by sacralization of Ingroup concerns (β = .15, p < .001). Of course, indicating that wars can sometimes be justified is a far cry from perpetrating acts of idealistic violence; we hope that future research can more directly investigate the links between sacralization of specific foundational concerns and idealistic violence in support of those moral ends. More generally, we hope that moral psychologists will begin using the scale as a way to measure individual differences in the tendency to sacralize values and objects. We predict that the differences measured by the scale will interact with many of the manipulations currently used in moral psychology experiments, which frequently pit values against each other.
Conclusion: Many Sacred Paths to the Same Evil effective depending on this as well. Different evils may lead to violent crusades to stop those evils in different ways. It is our hope that Moral Foundations Theory, as applied to sacredness and evil, can help us understand and prevent the perceived necessity of breaking so many eggs. Note. Range for all items and subscale means is 1-8 (see Appendix for response options). "# Never" is the average number of items (out of 4) the subsample indicated they would never do for any amount of money; it is a stricter criterion of sacredness than the overall mean, in that it only considers refusals to enter into the taboo tradeoff altogether.
